To the surprise of many observers, the 2005 International Comparison Program (ICP) found substantially higher purchasing power parity (PPP) rates, relative to market exchange rates, in most developing countries. For example, China's price level index-the ratio of its PPP to its exchange rate-doubled between the 1993 and 2005 rounds of the ICP. The paper tries to explain the observed changes in PPPs. Consistently with the BalassaSamuelson model, evidence is found of a "dynamic Penn effect," whereby more rapidly growing economies experience steeper increases in their price level index. This paper-a product of the Director's office, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand and improve current macroeconomic data. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mravallion@worldbank.org. This effect has been even stronger for initially poorer countries. Thus the widely-observed static (crosssectional) Penn effect has been attenuated over time. On also taking account of exchange rate changes and prior participation in the ICP's price surveys, 99 percent of the variance in the observed changes in PPPs is explicable. Using a nested test, the World Bank's longstanding method of extrapolating PPPs between ICP rounds using inflation rates alone is out performed by the model proposed in this paper.
Introduction
Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates ("PPPs 2 Due to the changes in PPPs, real GDP was revised downwards for many low-and middle-income countries, and substantially so for some. In the Asia-Pacific region, real GDP for 2005 was revised down by 30% (World Bank, 2008b) .
These large data revisions have been attributed to the changes in data and methods that were introduced in the 2005 ICP round, as described in World Bank (2008a,b) . A potentially important difference is that (compared to prior ICP rounds) stricter quality standards were used in the 2005 price surveys, to assure that the ICP was obtaining prices for internationally comparable commodities. This is important given that one expects that lower quality goods are consumed in poorer countries, creating a risk that (without strict standards in defining the products to be priced) one will underestimate the cost of living in poor countries by confusing quality differences with price differences. With better funding of the ICP in 2005, clearer product descriptions were developed.
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The least squares regression line has an intercept of -0.580 (While s.e.=0.236) and slope of 1.057 (s.e.=0.025); R 2 =0.938; n=136. One can reject the null hypothesis that the original estimate is an unbiased predictor of the revised estimate (i.e., intercept=0, slope=1); the F-test is 4.491 with prob 0.013.
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Methodological changes between ICP rounds cast doubt on the comparability of the resulting PPPs over time. This is one reason why users often avoid mixing PPPs between ICP rounds, letting national price data override the ICP data for inter-temporal comparisons. In other words, the PPP conversion is done at the ICP benchmark year. It has been argued that this is the most reasonable practice, given the changes in methodology (Dalgaard and Sørensen, 2002; World Bank, 2008b; Chen and Ravallion, 2010a) . Theoretical arguments have been made both for and against this practice. Nuxoll (1994) argues that the real growth rates measured using local deflators better reflect the trade-offs facing decision makers at the country level, and thus have a firmer foundation in the economic theory of index numbers. Of course, this means that the economic aggregates may well lose purchasing power comparability as one goes further back in time from the ICP benchmark year. In the context of studies of economic growth using PWT, Johnson et al. (2009) argue instead that comparisons should only be made between ICP rounds, since only then can one be sure that the economic aggregates are consistently evaluated at purchasing power parity.
All this begs a neglected question: Can we make sense of the changes in PPPs?
This paper tries to answer that question by comparing the latest (2005) PPPs with those for 1993 and 1985. Unlike most past empirical studies of PPPs, which have focused on the cross-sectional differences, this paper is concerned with explaining the observed changes over time. I focus on the price level index, defined as the PPP for GDP divided by the exchange rate (US=100%); 3 the inverse of this index is sometimes also called the real exchange rate. For the same reason that one uses PPPs rather than exchange rates for international comparisons, it can be hypothesized here that the PPP will tend to rise relative to the market exchange rate in a growing economy. In the models of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) this happens if economic growth comes with higher labor productivity in the traded-goods sector (relative to non-traded goods). This can be thought of as a dynamic Penn effect (DPE), corresponding to the widely-observed static Penn effect in which the price level index tends to be higher in richer countries. 4 3 While the term "price level index" is widely used in the literature, it is potentially confusing, since the index is a relative price-the ratio of two nominal prices. But I will stick to common usage. 4 The term "Penn effect" appears to be due to Samuelson (1994) and stems from Penn World Tables (PWT) (Summers and Heston, 1991) , which provided the data that were used to establish this effect empirically. Evidence of a static Penn effect in data from various rounds of the ICP is reported in Balassa (1964) , Rogoff (1996 ), World Bank (2008 , and Deaton and Heston (2010) , amongst others. The 4 Whether one would see the DPE in a growing developing country is a moot point. It can be argued that such economies are characterized by factor-market imperfections and surplus labor, dulling the Balassa-Samuelson mechanism. Productivity increases for non-traded goods could also dull the effect. In addition to the possibility of a DPE, one can also expect that there will be measurement errors confounding the PPP comparisons.
A better understanding of the economics of PPPs changes should help in estimating PPPs for the (many) years for which there is no ICP round, with implications for the extent of the data revisions needed at each new ICP. There are two distinct problems of missing data in estimating PPPs; the first is that some countries chose not to participate in the ICP's price surveys, while the second is that there are long gaps between those surveys. Existing data compilations (such as the World Bank's World Development Indicators) use extrapolations based on non-ICP data to fill in these missing PPPs, but very different types of data are used. The extrapolations to deal with the first problem are based on GDP per capita at market exchange rates, exploiting the static Penn effect. By contrast, in addressing the second problem, the PPPs for non-benchmark years are estimated by re-scaling the PPP from the most recent ICP round according to the inflation rate (GDP deflator for the GDP PPP, and Consumer Price Index for the consumption PPP) in the country in question relative to the US inflation rate. The reliability of this method is unclear.
While in theory, a suitable inter-temporal price index could deliver reliable extrapolations, it is far from obvious how well the methods used in practice perform, notably in reflecting the changes in the relative price of non-traded goods in growing economies.
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However, as this paper will show, there is another possible method for the inter-temporal extrapolations, consistent with how the first problem of missing data is dealt with. If the relationship between price levels and mean income-the static Penn effect that is used to deal with the cross-sectional missing data-also holds over time then this could be exploited in the dynamic extrapolation methods between ICP rounds, thus offering scope for reducing the need for the large data revisions often implied by each new round of ICP data. 6 most common parametric test entails regressing the log of the price level index on the log of GDP per capita in $US at market exchange rates.
Neither the underlying prices nor the aggregation methods are typically the same between the national deflators and the PPPs constructed by the ICP.
To see how well the changes over time in price levels can be explained, I have assembled a data file of the price level index (PPP for GDP over exchange rate) and GDP per capita at PPP for the 2005 and 1993 ICP rounds for all countries (developed or developing). These are the World Bank's estimates, rather than Penn World Tables (PWT) . 7 I will also study the changes in PPPs between 1985 (using PWT) and 2005.
The following section summarizes the arguments as to why one might expect the PPP changes to be predictable. Section 3 describes the empirical models to be estimated while section 
What might account for the observed changes in PPPs between ICP rounds?
Some of the country-specific factors that influence price levels (or, equivalently, real exchange rates) can be treated as time-invariant between ICP rounds. 8 By focusing instead on the changes in PPPs, the following analysis will eliminate the influence of all additivelyseparable error components stemming from such country-specific factors.
An important clue to why PPPs change over time can be found in the very same reason PPPs were developed. It has long been recognized that international comparisons of GDP at market exchange rates are deceptive about the differences in real income, given that some commodities are not internationally traded, notably most services. Without trade, there is no mechanism for assuring price parity across borders. The most common economic explanation of why the PPP would differ systematically from the nominal exchange rate is the BalassaSamuelson model (outlined independently by Balassa, 1964, and Samuelson, 1964) . 9 This assumes a competitive market economy in which all factors of production are fully employed 7
There are methodological differences between the World Bank's PPPs and those in PWT; see Deaton and Heston (2010) for a useful overview of those differences. In using the Balassa-Samuelson model to explain why PPPs tend to be lower (relative to market exchange rates) in poorer countries, it is assumed that the more developed the country the higher its labor productivity in traded goods, but that productivity for non-traded goods does not vary systematically with level of development. A higher marginal product of labor in traded goods production comes with a higher wage rate, which is also binding on the non-traded goods sector (given that labor is freely mobile), implying a higher price of non-traded goods in more developed countries and thus a higher overall price level. By the same reasoning, low real wages in poor countries entail that non-traded goods tend to be cheaper. The ratio of the purchasing power parity rate to the market exchange rate will thus be an increasing function of income.
This argument helped reinforce the (considerable) international statistical effort that has gone into the development of purchasing power parity exchange rates, led by the International Comparison Program (although PPPs existed before Balassa-Samuelson) . The PPP rate expresses a currency's value in terms of its purchasing power over commodities, both traded and non-traded, relative to the numeraire currency (almost invariably the $US). The PPP is based on the prices actually paid for goods; the exchange rate does not directly enter into its calculation (though of course it will matter indirectly, via domestic prices and spending patterns).
The Balassa-Samuelson model offers a theoretical explanation for the Penn effect. Balassa (1964) found evidence that richer countries tend to have higher price levels in data for 12 countries. Since then most empirical tests of the Penn effect have used cross-sectional data from the ICP. Every round of the ICP appears to have confirmed the Penn effect.
10 Based on such 10 7 evidence, the Wikipedia entry on the Penn effect describes it as "a consistent econometric result for at least fifty years."
The economic mechanism postulated by the Balassa-Samuelson model should also hold over time, as long as the data are in reasonable accord with the assumptions of the model. As a poor country develops, its productivity in the traded goods sector will then rise, as will the real wage rate, and so its PPP will move closer to its exchange rate. There is some supportive evidence in time series data for specific developed countries, notably Japan, but not others (Rogoff, 1996) . Past tests of whether the implications of the Balassa-Samuelson model (including the Penn effect) hold over time have been largely confined to developed countries.
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Arguments can be made for and against the Balassa-Samuelson assumptions. A key assumption is that richer countries have higher relative productivity in traded goods. Balassa (1964) presented (influential) evidence supporting that assumption. But technology has changed considerably since 1964, entailing greater potential for productivity growth in the services sector.
Take, for example, India's booming business services sector. This sector has seen very high growth since the early 1990s, facilitated by the availability of skilled labor and changes in information technology. 12 Superficially this does not sound much like the Balassa-Samuelson model. However, it should be noted that this change has also come with a transformation of many business services into internationally traded commodities. So it can be argued that India's rising productivity in services is in fact consistent with Balassa-Samuelson. By this view, it is the presumption that services are non-traded that is now questionable, given technological change.
However, even if growth does come with rising productivity for traded goods, the way labor markets work in reality may not pass this effect fully onto wage rates in the non-traded goods sector. This could happen if there are impediments to labor mobility. For example, labor hiring in the traded-goods sector may be subject to (explicit or implicit) contracts favoring incumbents, leaving the services sector as a residual employer. Or there may be specialized skill requirements, which effectively restrict entry to the traded-goods sector in poor countries with limited human capital. A wedge between wage rates in the two sectors could also arise if the traded-goods sector is the "formal" sector, which is taxed, while services are informal, and untaxed. Then we may find a persistent wage gap (with W T >W N ), creating a potential disconnect
The only exception I know of is Choudhri and Khan (2005) who find evidence consistent with Balassa-Samuelson effects in panel data for 16 developing countries.
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See Kotwal et al. (2009) for evidence on this point. 8 between relative prices and relative labor productivities between the two sectors, thus breaking the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Whether that actually happens depends on how the relative wage rate (W T /W N ) is in fact determined. However, the key point is that with market imperfections it is an open question whether the PPP will start to approach the exchange rate in poor but growing economies, or whether it continues to lag. Given market frictions, one might also conjecture that the DPE only starts to emerge when the growth rate is sufficiently high.
There are also measurement errors in the PPPs. While these are largely unobservable, one observable clue is that not all of the countries that participated in the 2005 round had participated in 1993. Most of the PPPs for these non-benchmark countries were estimated econometrically by the ICP team using regressors observed for both sets of countries.
13 Any bias in those estimates will be reflected in the subsequent changes observed when the country participates properly in the ICP's price surveys. This too could dull the effect of economic growth on price levels. (1) A number of remarks will help motivate and interpret this model. First, equation (1) can be interpreted as the time-differenced version of the widely used double-log model in the crosscountry literature on the Penn effect, incorporating a year effect but common slope (though this will be relaxed later).
Modeling the changes in PPPs
14 Second, unlike the cross-sectional specification, the parameter estimates See World Bank (2008a). The log GDP per capita in 1993 PPP was regressed on log GDP per capita at market exchange rates and the log of the secondary school enrollment rate This is equivalent to regressing the log of the price level index on these same two variables (though with different parameters of course). (China's PPP for 1993 was estimated by a different method, as noted later).
14 The most common specification for the Penn effect in the literature expresses the log of the price level index as a linear function of the log of GDP per capita at exchange rates. Note that this is equivalent 9 in (1) will be robust to any (time-invariant) (1) can be written equivalently in terms of GDP at PPP:
I will treat the growth rate as exogenous in equation (1). This can be questioned. It has been argued by Rodrik (2008) and Korinek and Servén (2010) that policies promoting a high real exchange rate-implying a lower price level index-can promote longer-term economic growth by stimulating exports. To some extent, these can be thought of as long-run policies that would be within the country fixed effect for the level of the price index, and so be swept away in the time-differenced specification in (1). However, any changes in exchange rate policy that impact on growth would still leave a bias. If a higher real exchange rate does in fact promote growth then the OLS estimate of (1) will under-estimate the true value of  . 15 Correcting for this bias would yield even stronger evidence in favor of the existence of the DPE.
The basic specification in (1) will be augmented in three ways. First, one can think of equations (1) and (2) as restricted forms of the following equation: (3); indeed, the "law of one price" implies the market exchange rate is determined by the PPP, although the fact that price level indices are less than unity for many countries discredits this as a model of exchange rate determination, at least in the short term. 16 Nonetheless, it would clearly be worrying if one could reject the null that
Second, I will allow the DPE parameter to vary with initial GDP. I expect a negative interaction effect, on the grounds that it is the initially poorer countries where higher growth should come with the type of structural change that would put upward pressure on the price level to the alternative specification sometimes found in which the log of GDP at PPP is a linear function of the log of GDP at exchange rates; the slope parameters in these two specifications sum to unity.
index. I will also test whether the 1993 PPP was derived from actual price surveys-in which case we refer to the country as a 1993 "benchmark country" (following common practice). So an upward revision to the price level is generally indicated. However, the bulk of this was for countries with initially low price levels. Indeed, the cumulative distribution functions implied by the densities in Figure 2 are virtually indistinguishable for price levels above 60%. 
Results
The restriction clearly performs well. Given that this is a regression for changes rather than levels, it is also notable that almost 99% of the variance is accounted for. The slope of the regression line is -0.059 with a standard error of 0.014.
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The regression was very similar for the non-OECD sample.
Note that this is not simply a difference between OECD and non-OECD countries.
Indeed, the elasticity of the price level to economic growth is actually higher for the OECD sub- 
. The most likely explanation for this discrepancy appears to be that a large endogeneity bias emerges when one tests for the DPE using growth rates measured in PPP $s. Latent factors influencing the PPP will jointly affect both the price level index and the GDP growth rate, though in opposite directions (given that the PPP appears in the numerator of the price index, but the denominator of deflated GDP). Estimating the equation in the form of (1) 
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Essentially this excludes OECD countries in Asia but includes the Pacific Islands.
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As a further check on the restriction that 1   , on re-estimating in the form of (3), the augmented specification corresponding to (6) 
The Penn effect is still weaker for the non-benchmark countries. So this is not the explanation.
Second, possibly the ICP participation effect stems from non-linearities in the Penn effect, given that the non-benchmark countries tended to be poorer. 25 The following regression encompasses both the ICP participation effect and the negative interaction with initial GDP:
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The missing variable is the secondary school enrollment rate. 
The negative interaction effect is still evident, though less precisely estimated (which is not too surprising given the tendency for ICP non-participants to be poorer). A significant difference between the benchmark and non-benchmark models is still evident.
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The mystery remains. The non-benchmark countries are quite heterogeneous. 27 It appears that all countries were invited to participate in the 1993 ICP, but the (unknown) process determining why some countries chose not too was based on variables that are correlated with the strength of DPE. When interpreted in terms of the Balassa-Samuelson model, it appears that the countries that chose not to participate had latent characteristics that made their productivity differences for tradable goods less responsive to the differences in their GDP per capita.
One can speculate on one possible explanation. Some countries undoubtedly chose not to participate in the 1993 ICP for idiosyncratic, possibly political, reasons. But it can be expected that many non-participants lacked the public-institutional capacity for implementing the ICP's surveys. Furthermore, it can be conjectured that weak statistical capacity is probably correlated with weak institutions more generally, including weak states. Suppose now that institutional capacity is cooperant with labor in the production of traded goods-such that the marginal product of that labor is lower when institutions are weaker. Then we can see that nonparticipation in the ICP could signify a weaker relationship between GDP and the relative productivity of labor in the traded-goods sector, and (hence) a weaker Penn effect in the data.
The ICP participation effect helps explain why the increases in the price level index tended to be higher in countries with lower GDP per capita in 1993, as seen in Figure 3 . Simply adding a control for benchmark countries brings the slope of the regression line in Figure 3 down from -0.059 (s.e.=0.014) to -0.037 (s.e.=0.014). Adding the 1993 GDP to equation (6) gives:
The difference also persisted when I allowed for non-linearity in the underlying cross-sectional double log model for the Penn effect, by adding 
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The specific countries are Albania, Angola, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, India, Israel, Lesotho, Macao China, Macedonia, Malta, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, and Uganda.
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The weighted mean coefficient on GDP in 1993 is -0.039 (s.e.=0.002), as compared to a regression coefficient without controls of -0.059 (s.e.=0.014). 
(Estimating in the form of equation (3) 
Imposing the restriction that 
China's controversial PPP revisited
The new PPP for China from the 2005 ICP attracted much attention, given that it implies that the country's GDP per capita at PPP for 2005 is 40% lower than we thought, at $4,091 rather See Deaton and Heston (2010) for a description of the differences in methods.
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The negative interaction effect with the initial (log) GDP was also evident using the 1985 PPPs, but for brevity this discussion is confined to the simpler version of the DPE.
Some observers have questioned whether China's new PPP is credible. Bhalla (2008) argues that, when combined with the official growth rates, the new PPP implies that China was too poor to be believed in (say) 1950; in Bhalla's words, the World Bank's numbers imply that "most Asians (were) dead in 1950." Maddison and Wu (2008) and Deaton and Heston (2010) raise similar objections, leading Maddison and Wu to claim that the new PPP for China is "weird" and "implausible." It is far from clear whether these extrapolations back in time constitute a sound basis for validating the new PPP for China. Ravallion (2010) This assessment is affected little by allowing for over-estimation of China's growth rate. Maddison (2007) has claimed that China's long-run growth rate is over-estimated by possibly two percentage points per year (though also see Holz's, 2006 , comments on Maddison's assumptions). However, even cutting two percentage points off China's annual growth rate and re-estimating the regressions, 31 the China coefficient is still 0.320 (s.e.=0.066) in equation (6) and 0.282 (s.e.=0.071) in equation (7). proposed by Chen and Ravallion (2010b) , using non-ICP data on rural prices, brought China's (expenditure-weighted) price index for consumption (rather than GDP as a whole) down from 52% to about 45%, though still considerably higher than the prior estimates of around 25% based on the 1993 ICP (19% for GDP). Assuming a similar correction for the GDP price index, the combined effect with the DPE (given China's high growth rate), leaves the doubling of China's price index almost fully explained.
Implications for estimating PPPs for non-benchmark years
As noted in the introduction, the most widely-used method for extrapolating and updating cannot reject the null hypothesis that the inflation rate has no effect, once one controls for the DPE and the change in market exchange rates.
Another way to assess these methods is to compare their errors in predicting the 2005 PPP. Figure 8 plots the empirical (normal kernel) density functions of those errors (log of PPP minus its predicted value). One density in Figure 8 is for the errors obtained using the inflation- More precisely, the previous PPPs were derived using a bilateral comparison of 1986 prices between the United States and China as documented in Ruoen and Kai (1995) . 33 The ICP aims to collect prices from a representative sample of outlets in each country. However, this was not possible in China and the ICP only covered 11 cities. has an elasticity of unity to the market exchange rate and that the DPE coefficient is 0.293-based on the cross-sectional value estimated above using the 1993 PPPs. I also give the density function for this simple and feasible estimator in Figure 8 . This does not yield zero-mean error, but the mean error is much smaller than the inflation-adjustment method (-0.017 versus 0.071),
and it also trims the large errors in the tails generated by the latter method.
Conclusions
The This paper has tried to make sense of the PPP changes between ICP rounds. The paper reports new evidence consistent with the existence of a Balassa-Samuelson effect over time such that the PPP rises relative to the exchange rate in a growing economy. There are signs that this only starts to happen with a sufficiently high growth rate. The paper finds that this "dynamic Penn effect" is even stronger in initially poorer countries. Thus the widely-observed static Penn effect (whereby the price level index is lower in poorer countries) has been attenuated over time.
The higher price levels (lower real exchange rates) for many developing countries The upshot of all this is that many of the large revisions to real GDP data in Figure 1 could have been avoided by exploiting some simple but neglected insights from the original Balassa-Samuelson model-ironically, the same model that had helped motivate the considerable international statistical effort since the 1960s to collect price data for measuring PPPs-so as to better understand how price levels evolve over time in developing countries. 
